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I. INTRODUCTION
No loss is greater than losing one's child. To the joyfully expectant mother
or father-to-be, the promise of that child begins at conception. When an expectant
parent loses the expectation of the wanted child through a wrongfully,
preternaturally terminated pregnancy, he or she moums the lost promise of that
child. Recognizing this lost expectancy, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
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Virginia, in Farley v. Sartin,2 unanimously declared a non-viabft fetut to be a
"person" under the West Virginia wrongful death statute, 5 to permit an anguished
father to sue for the wrongful death of his wife and the fetus she carried.
Motivated by compassion for tort victims and a wish to deter tortious
wrongdoers, the court sought to compensate for the lost child-to-be, and held the
fetus to be a person prior to viability and birth. How can such an act of judicial
compassion be regarded as anything but wonderful? Is not this an act of justice to
be celebrated? Or, is the court's declaration of fetal personhood frightening because
it challenges constitutionally protected assumptions about a woman's right to
terminate a pregnancy? Is it then an act to be feared? I contend that the decision is
both, wonderful and frightening.
Understanding its declaration of fetal personhood to be a radical judicial act,
one rejected by most other states and contradicted by the United States Supreme
Court's jurisprudence on women's reproductive autonomy and privacy, the court
anticipated the attention attracted by its pronouncement that a fetus is a person under
the West Virginia wrongful death statute. 6 Anti-abortion activists heralded the
decision as progress in the fight for fetal rights.7 Pro-choice advocates condemned

2 Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995).

Viability and nonviability are medical concepts based on whether or not a fetus is capable of living
outside of the mother's uterus. THOMAS L. STEDMAN, STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1714 (25th

ed. 1990).
Stedman defines "fetus" as "[tihe unborn young of a viviparous animal after it has taken form in the
uterus. In man, the product of conception from the end of the eighth week to the moment of
conception." Id. at 573.
4

The West Virginia Code provides inpertinent part:
Whenever the death of aperson shall be caused by wrongful act, ... and the act
...is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to
maintain an action to recover damages... then.., the person who... would have
been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable .. notwithstanding the death
of the person injured.
W. VA. CODE § 55-7-5 (1994) (emphasis added).
Id. at 524. Comments by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Farley reveal that the
court foresaw the controversy. Id. Immediately after stating the issue, the Court warned, "[O]ur
discussion and holding are limited to this issue only, and what we say in this opinion should not be
considered as indicative of our views on other unrelated issues, especially those on abortion." Id.
6

See Frances A. McMorris, Courts Are Giving New Rights to Fetuses, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 1996, at

B 1. The reporter states that "abortion opponents have long argued that [viability] ...an arbitrary
standard." Id. McMorris quotes Charlotte Snead, president of an anti-abortion organization, West
Virginians For Life as saying, "'Cases like these indicate the value that even the courts place on a
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it as a retreat from women's rights.8 Both sides believed, however, that Farley
portends expanded fetal rights. The difference between the sides is that one
welcomed the possibility and the other feared it. Foreseeing these oppositional
reactions, the Court attempted to confine any potential legal effects of its decision.9
To those who would look to Farleyto justify expanding fetal rights in other
areas of the law, the court made clear that it intended its decision to apply only to
West Virginia's wrongful death statute.' The court drove this message home by
repeating its admonition that its decision "neither affects nor interferes with the
constitutional protection afforded a woman who chooses to have an abortion,"" and
that the decision to terminate a pregnancy is governed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and cannot be abrogated by a state
court decision on wrongful death.' 2 The court stated, "[tlo be clear, a wrongful
death action will not lie against a woman who chooses to exercise her constitutional
right to have an abortion."' 3 In its summary, the court repeated itself, stating that
"our decision is a limited one and is in no way intended to be contrary to the
14
constitutional right of a woman to have an abortion."'
Do the court's many protestations reveal not only its intent to confine its
decision, but also its fear that it could not? I do not suggest duplicity on the court's
part; that it said one thing, while knowing the opposite to be true. I do suggest,
however, that the court sensed that by declaring a fetus a person from the moment
of conception for the purpose of wrongful death it was implicating the foundation
of women's reproductive autonomy and privacy.
Recognizing and honoring relational loss and establishing and maintaining
women's reproductive autonomy were two prongs of a philosophical debate entered
into by the Farley court. This debate, about whether the law's embrace of the

child." Id.
Id. Ms. McMorris also interviews Kathryn Kolbert, vice president of the abortion-rights group, the
Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, who states that 'recognition of the [nonviable] fetus as an
individual person is a back-door way to undermine the rights guaranteed by Roe vs. Wade."' Id.
9 Farley,466 S.E.2d at 534-35.
1oId.
" Id. at 534 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
12

Id.

13 Id.
4 Farley,466 S.E.2d at 535.
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primacy of relational concerns can be reconciled with individual privacy and
autonomy, is the subject of an ongoing dialogue in feminist jurisprudence between
cultural and liberal feminists.
To explain the difference between the two for introductory purposes, I offer
accurate, albeit simplified, descriptions. Cultural feminists, also referred to as
relational feminists and the term I use from this point on, begin with the premise that
traditional liberal theory is based on a male standard as the universal experience of
the world, one of separation and independent individuality. This, they contend,
ignores women's different experience of life, which is one of connection, and
interdependent relationships. Liberal feminists acknowledge the absence of
women's perspectives and experiences in shaping traditional liberal theory. They
argue, however, that once liberal theory incorporates and responds to women's
concerns, its basic liberal principles of individual autonomy and privacy will
advance women's equality.
In this Article I turn to these two branches of feminist jurisprudence to
demonstrate why the court's attempt to confine Farley with declarations of limited
application was insufficient in the face of such fundamental philosophical questions.
Section II places Farley in historical perspective, describing how wrongful death
actions for the loss of children have evolved. Section III introduces relational and
liberal feminism and relies on Professor Linda McClain's work in which she
analyzes the implications of relational feminism for women's reproductive
autonomy. 5 Section IV uses Farleyas an example of a possible result of relational
feminism's ethic of care when reproductive autonomy protections are not
incorporated. To illustrate the result, Section IV charts the tendency of declarations
of fetal personhood in wrongful death actions to be used to create civil and criminal
liability for maternal conduct during pregnancy that jeopardizes fetal health.
Section V argues that the attempt of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
to limit the effects of Farley was insufficient because the court does not anticipate
and explicitly reject the degree to which it opens the door to creating an adversarial
relationship between the mother and the fetus. Finally, this Section closes with the
observation that to confine effectively its decision, the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia had to state more than that a woman's Constitutional rights were
untouched by its decision, but that her autonomy interests as a moral decision maker
were left intact.

Is Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection and Feminist
Jurisprudence,65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171 (1992).
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I. EVOLVING DEFINmONS OF "PERSON" FOR WRONGFUL DEATH

Purposeof Wrongfid Death Actions

A.

At common law one could recover from a tortious wrongdoer if he or she
caused injury, but not if his or her wrongful conduct resulted in death.' 6 Thus, one
could not recover for the death of a family member. 7 In these situations families
had no remedy and wrongdoers were not held accountable. Recognizing the
absurdity of this result, that one could recover for injury but not for death, legislative
bodies began to permit wrongful death actions with the passage of the Fatal
Accidents Act of 1846 by the English Parliament. 8 In this early developmental
period, some American courts expressed moral repulsion at placing economic value
on something as sacred as human life.' 9 Although for many this uneasiness remains,
every state now has a wrongful death statute, the purpose of which is to compensate
those who have a legitimate claim to the decedent's succor.20 Wrongful death
statutes protect "relational interest[s]." 2'
All wrongful death statutes are similar. The two areas of greatest similarity
are the beneficiaries and the damages permitted. Typical beneficiaries include
spouses and children. Damages are primarily based on pecuniary loss to the
beneficiary and most jurisdictions do not permit damages based solely on grief.
Despite this, most jurisdictions find a way to value the lost society and comfort by
placing pecuniary value on relational loss.22
Wrongful DeathActions for the Death ofa Living Child

B.

According to Professor Zelinger, a sociologist, with damages for wrongful
16

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 125A (5th ed. 1984).

"7See, e.g., Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808) (holding that a husband had no action for his
wife's death).
"1 KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 127. This Act came to be known as Lord Campbell's Act and
wrongful death statutes are referred to as Lord Campbell statutes. Id.

"9 See, e.g., Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180 (1867). The court stated "[t]o the cultivated and
enlightened mind, looking at human life in the light of the Christian religion as sacred, the idea of
compensating its loss in money is revolting." Id.
20 1 STUARTM. SPEISERETAL., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 4:33-4:37 (3rd ed. 1992).
2 KEETONETAL., supra note 15,

§ 127.

22Id.
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death based on pecuniary loss, damages valuations for the loss of a child in the
Then, children played an
nineteenth century were relatively straightforward.'
important productive role in the family whether through their work on the farm or
business or in wage labor outside the home.24 However, when children ceased to be
viewed as productive members of the family, around the same time that education
became both universally available and compulsory and child labor was prohibited,
the legal evaluation of the child's work fell.' Professor Zelizer marks this point at
which the "sacralization of childhood" became widespread and was no longer
limited to the upper classes who had no need to regard their children as
economically productive."
Many other forces may have contributed to this emergence of the sacred
child. Historians, demographers and economists all contribute theoretically to
understanding these forces.2 7 Transforming children from producers to resource
consumers led to a desire for a reduction in family size, although this was not always
accomplished.28 Infant mortality dropped with the increase in the medical
knowledge of birth, disease and infant nutrition, thereby reducing the need to have
so many children.29 Methods of birth control became available?' Ultimately, most
parents expected to have smaller families and as a result came to view each child as

23

See VIviANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF

CHILDREN(1985). Much of this section is based on an excellent socio-historical study of the economic
valuation of children from the mid-eighteenth century to the present. Chapter 5 of the book, entitled
From Wrongful Death to Wrongful Birth: The ChangingLegal Evaluation of Children, traces the
monetary value placed on the death of a child in wrongful death suits. Id. at 138-68.
24

Id. at 139-40, 142-46.

2-Id at 146-51.
26

Id. at 151.

27 ZELIZER,

supra note 22, at 7-15. Professor Zelizer is asociologist and discusses theories from other

disciplines to illustrate the gap left by the lack of a complete sociological work. Id. She completed
her research and book to fill this gap. Id.
21 Id. at 8.
29

Id. at 10.

30 Several full length books on the history of birth control and movements promoting or banning it

support the proposition that birth control knowledge became more widespread after the start of the
twentieth century.

See LINDA GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT:

BIRTH CONTROL IN

AMERICA (rev. ed. 1990); JAMES REED, FROM PRIVATE VICE TO PUBLIC VIRTUE: THE BIRTH CONTROL
MOVEMENT AND AMERICAN SOCIETY SINCE 1830 (1978); ROSALIND PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND
WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM (1984).
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precious and irreplaceable. 3'
C.

The Fetusas PotentialChild

Along with this transformation of the economic value of a child from
producer to object of love is the transformation of wrongful death actions from
children to nonviable fetuses.32 In 1884, Justice Holmes, writing for the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, held that a fetus was united with the woman who
33
carried it and therefore no separate right of action existed for the unborn fetus.
Justice Holmes' pronouncement of the mother and fetus as a single entity went
unchallenged until 1946, when the United States District Court in the District of
Columbia held that when a fetus was born alive, but died from injuries suffered in
utero, its parents had an action for wrongful death. 34 The Court reasoned that once
born alive, the fetus was not part of the woman, but was a separate "person" with
standing. By 1967, every state permitted recovery for prenatal injuries to fetuses,
if they were born alive.35 In 1969 a federal district court held that West Virginia's
36
wrongful death statute's definition of "person" included a viable unborn fetus.

31 ZELIZER, supra note 22, at 11.

That a high rate of infant mortality could also contribute to a
sentimental view of infants as precious is also possible. Professor Zelizer cites an article by historian
John Demos. See John Demos, Infancy and Childhood in Plymouth Colony, in THE AMERICAN
FAMILY 157-65 (Gordon, ed., 1978). Demos' research reveals a highly sentimentalized view of
infants, which he attributes to an extremely high infant mortality rate. Id.
32 Another development that may play a role is the expansion of tort liability. This topic is beyond
the scope of this Article. Articles on whether, how and why tort liability has expanded are too
numerous to cite here. However, whether enough is known about the tort litigation system to
determine whether there is a crisis is the subject of an exhaustive article by Michael J. Saks, which
summarizes both the sources of the public perception of the crisis as well as the empirical data on the
subject. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation
System - and WhyNot?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147 (1992).
" Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884). Justice Holmes used the phrase, "child en ventre
sa mere" to describe the unborn fetus. Id. This phrase is also used by the Supreme Court of Appeals
West Virginia in Farley v. Sartin. 466 S.E.2d at 534. The Supreme Court of Illinois agreed that "an
unborn child was but a part of the mother, and had no existence or being which could be the subjectmatter of injury distinct from the mother, and that an injury to it was but an injury to the mother."
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 56 N.E. 638 (III. 1900).
34 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
'5 See, e.g., Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., 165 N.E.2d 912 (Mass. 1960); Carroll v. Skloff, 202
A.2d 9 (Pa. 1965); Hall v. Murphy, 113 S.E.2d 790 (S.C. 1960).
36 Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.W. Va. 1969).
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Two years later, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia adopted this
position.37
To understand how the concept of a "person" on whose behalf one can bring
a wrongful death suit continues to broaden, it helps to construct a continuum. Such
a continuum is based on three variables and how they combine to result in death.
One variable is the stage of human development as measured by the viability or
nonviability of the fetus. A second variable is the point of time during the
pregnancy at which the injury occurs. The third and final variable is whether the
injured fetus is born alive. With these variables in mind, the continuum begins with
the traditional legal concept of "person" or personhood, a person born alive and
fatally injured after birth.38 Next on the continuum, are fetuses that are injured in
utero while viable, are born alive, but subsequently die from the prenatal injuries.
Following this are injured nonviable fetuses that are born alive, but later die from
the injuries suffered in the womb. Next come viable fetuses fatally injured while in
utero and never born alive. At the endpoint are fetuses fatally injured while
nonviable and not born alive. Four jurisdictions occupy this endpoint, including
West Virginia as a result of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia's Farley
decision. 9
This trend of expanding the definition of person in wrongful death actions
has not occurred in isolation from other legal, cultural, medical and technological
trends. First, if one accepts that tort liability has grown since the turn of the century,
expanding liability for wrongful death is of a piece. Second, the debate about fetal
personhood is a significant subject of public discourse. Third, medicine and
technology to support fetuses born prematurely challenge assumptions about
viability. Fourth, following Professor Zelizer's theory of increased sentimentalizing
of children leading to increased recognition of wrongful death actions, the next
logical step is to recognize the potential child in permitting wrongful death actions
for the fetus. There may be others, but these are the ones most evident in legal
discourse.

3' Baldwin v. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971).
38This is Justice Holmes' position in Dietrich. Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).

Prior to Farley, Georgia and Missouri permitted a nonviable fetus to be the subject of a wrongful
death action. In Shirley v. Bacon, the Court of Appeals of Georgia announced that a "quick" fetus, one
that had reached a stage of development at which the mother could feel its in-utero movements, was
a person for wrongful death purposes. 267 S.E.2d 809 (Ga. 1980). The Supreme Court of Missouri
held that the definition of person included a nonviable fetus for wrongful death. See Connor v.
Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1995). Shortly after Farley,South Dakota adopted a definition of
person that includes a nonviable fetus. See Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D.
1996).
39
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Ill. RELATIONAL AND LIBERAL FEMINISM
Declaring a nonviable fetus to be a "person" for wrongful death purposes
implicates issues of women's reproductive autonomy. These issues are engaged by
relational and liberal feminists. Placing Farley in the context of the debate between
relational and liberal feminists sheds necessary light on the decision's significance.
This context begins with a brief history of the evolution of these feminist theories.
With second-wave feminism in the early 1970's, feminists began to develop a new
jurisprudence to provide theoretical models for analyzing the role law plays in
maintaining gender hierarchy.4" Using the plural "models" here is intentional
because there is not a single, monolithic feminism, nor is there a single feminist
jurisprudence.4' The first jurisprudence was one drawn primarily from traditional
liberalism.4 2 Through this theoretical lense, women called for equality, but at the
same time offered a critique of traditional liberalism as being constructed by men
and being modeled upon man and maleness.43 Not wanting to have men and
maleness define the standard for women, feminist scholars began to construct
theories placing women at the center of inquiry and using women's perspectives to
inform their work.'
Scholars debate the number and significance of the theories that emerged
during this active period in theory construction. There is, however, general
agreement that there are "three .. .schools of modern feminist jurisprudence:
liberalfeminism, culturalfeminism and radicalfeminism. ' 4 Most significantly, for
purposes of this article is the apparent tension between relational feminism and

" In PostmodernLegal Movements, Professor Gary Minda provides an introduction to jurisprudence
in the late twentieth century. Gary Minda, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCEATCENTURY'S END (1995). He includes feminist jurisprudence in chapter 7, Feminist

Legal Theory. Id. at 128-48.
41 Id. at
42

129.

Id.

41 Id. at

130-3 1.

44MINDA, supra note 39, at 130. Professor Minda states that "feminists sought to develop a distinctive

feminist jurisprudence 'built upon feminist insights into women's true nature, rather than upon
masculine insights into 'human nature."' Id. (citing Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism,

Method, and the State: TowardFeminist Jurisprudence,8 SIGNS 635 (1983)).
45 Id. at 134 (emphasis added) (citing Linda J. Lacey, Introducing Feminist Jurisprudence: An
Analysis of Oldahoma'sSeduction Statute, 25 TULSA L.J. 775, 780 (1990). Professor Minda adopts
her terms and departs from terms he used in his earlier work. Id.; see Gary Minda, Jurisprudential
Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L. J. 599, 626 (1989).
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liberal feminism. Professor Linda C. McClain analyzes relational feminism's
critique of liberalism and I base my portrayal of these tensions on her work.46 To
understand the debate on reproductive autonomy between liberal and relational
feminists one must have a basic understanding of the two schools and the primary
differences between them.
A.

Liberal Feminism

Liberal feminism draws its basic premises from traditional liberalism, but
criticizes liberalism for constructing its view of humanity from that of men and for
men only. Rather than rejecting the basic premises of liberalism, however, liberal
feminism adds women and women's perspective to liberalism. I do not mean that
liberal feminism is simply an "add women and stir" recipe, however. It is an
amalgam of adoption and modification of fundamental liberal premises.
The most significant premises of traditional liberalism adopted by liberal
feminists are familiar as they formed the basis for much of the legal reform wrought
by second wave feminists in the 1970s and 1980s. 47 As in liberalism generally, one
of the fundamental premises is of equality; that all people should be treated equally
under the law. This is the premise upon which the Equal Rights Amendment and
women's civil rights are based.48 A second fundamental premise is the individual

46 McClain, supra note 14, at 1174. In this article, Professor McClain "argue[s] that the feminist

critique of liberalism as presenting an atomistic and unconnected conception of the person attacks a
caricatured picture of liberalism." Id. By separating liberal theory from feminist jurisprudence she first
appears to ignore the "schools" of feminist theory, one of which is liberal feminist theory. She
clarifies, however, that she is primarily describing cultural or relational feminism and juxtaposing that
with liberal theory. Id. at 1174-75. In doing so she implies that liberal feminism is to be included in
liberalism generally. Id.
" See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (establishing an intermediate standard of equal protection
review under the Fourteenth Amendment to determine whether a classification based on gender is
unconstitutional); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (holding a state statute establishing different
ages for a parent's obligation to support sons and daughters to violate Fourteenth Amendment);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (striking down a federal statute permitting military men
to claim their wives as dependents, but requiring enlisted women to establish their husband's
dependency as contrary to Fourteenth Amendment); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (finding a state
statute giving a preference to men to administer estates to be a violation of equal protection guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
" To amend the United States Constitution, requires ratification by two-thirds (38) of the states.
Congress extended the deadline from 1979 to 1982, but the Equal Rights Amendment failed to gain
the necessary two-thirds of the states by the second deadline. Prior to this attempt to amend the
Constitution to clarify that gender discrimination in employment violated it, feminists were able to get
Congress to include gender in the Civil Rights Act. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§
701-16, 78 Stat. 241,253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-I 7).
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human right to autonomy. Rights to autonomy and its corollary, privacy, are the
basis upon which the United States Supreme Court grounds its reproductive
jurisprudence. 9 Thus, traditional liberalism supports a legal system based on the
separateness, the atomism, of individuals who compete with one another and need
the law to protect them from the incursions of other individuals on their freedom to
exercise their individual rights."
Some liberal feminists modify the fundamental premises of liberalism by
offering a different perspective from women's experience to redefine equality.5
They suggest that equality is not the same treatment, but different treatment that
results in equality. 2 This internal struggle in liberal feminism is often described as
the sameness/difference debate. 3 Liberal feminists who advocate a difference
paradigm of equality, argue that treating women the same as men merely perpetuates
the existing gender hierarchy. 4
B.

RelationalFeminism

Reacting to the primacy of the independent, unconnected rights bearer of
liberalism and liberal feminism, other feminists developed relational or cultural
feminism. In doing so, they rejected liberalism's premise that the law's role is to
protect individual rights and therefore, to maintain conditions in which independent
and unconnected human beings are protected against interdependency and
connection where the latter might interfere with the former. Instead relational
feminists premised their theory on a system of interdependence and mutual
responsibility.
Relational feminism is rooted in Professor Carol Gilligan's work on the
differences in moral development between girls and boys. 5 She based her "different
"' See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
" McClain, supra note 14, at 1173.
stSee Martha Minow, Justice Engendered,101 HARV. L. REv. 10 (1987).
See Wendy W. Williams, Equality'sRiddle: Pregnancyand the Equal Treatment/SpecialTreatment
Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1985).
" See Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Postmodern Path Beyond
Essentialism in Feministand CriticalRace Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296.
4 Id.
55 See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DiFFERENT VOICE (1982). Carol Gilligan is a professor of education at
Harvard University's Graduate School of Education.
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voice" theory on her research investigating whether there are differences in moral
development between boys and girls.56 Carol Gilligan was motivated by pioneering
research on moral development conducted by Lawrence Kohlberg, a professor of
moral psychology at Harvard, who used only boys as subjects.57 From this he had
concluded that the correct course of moral development in humans culminates in
recognizing the supremacy of individual rights as the model of justice. 8 Professor
Gilligan used both boys and girls in her study. 9 Her work demonstrated that there
are two distinct moral analytic processes.6" While she clarified that she did not
intend to make gendered generalizations, she observed that the justice/individual
rights mode is more often employed by boys and the justice/relational care by girls.6
Her work challenged Kohlberg's results of a singular correct moral process and
suggested that his results were limited by the gender of his subjects.62
Significantly for feminist legal theory, Gilligan's work came along just
when some feminists began to claim that women's perspective was not that of the
"atomistic" person upon which liberalism is based. Thus, Gilligan's work, even
though she was careful not to make generalizations based on gender, provided the
necessary fuel to energize claims of women's differences in epistemology and
morality. This work came along at a critical moment in the development of
relational feminism, as it supported claims that women see themselves as operating
within a web of relationships, a web in which care for others is crucial. 6'
From this emerged a cultural or relational feminist scholarship represented

56 Id. at

2.

Id. at 18.
8 Id. at20.
, Id. at 2.
GILLIGAN, supranote 54, at 2.

Id.; see also Carol Gilligan, Epilogue to MAKING CONNECTIONS 314,317-18 (Carol Gilligan et al.
eds., 1990) (explaining that Gilligan does not accept the claims made by others about her work, that
it proves essential differences between men and women).
61

62

GILLIGAN, supra note 54.

63 Other work arrived on the scene shortly after Gilligan's, which supported the development of
cultural or relational feminism. See, e.g., MARY F. BELENKY El"AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING:

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF, VOICE AND MIND (1986).
64

The image of the web comes from Gilligan who refers to "a network of connection, a web of

relationships." GILLIGAN, supra note 54 at 32.
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by the work of Professor Robin West 65 West argues for a new system of values for
law and society, one based on love, connection, interdependence and care6 6 She
claims that these values are rooted in women's experiences, both material and
existential,67 particularly the experience of pregnancy, childbirth and mothering6
Professor McClain argues that cultural or relational feminists rejection of
liberalism is based on a "caricature" of liberalism and "atomistic man." She relies
on two contemporary liberal theorists, John Rawls69 and Ronald Dworkin, 7to
demonstrate that liberalism also recognizes the importance of interdependence,
connection and care. The goal of her article is to focus attention on this false
dichotomy between cultural and relational feminism and liberalism. However, at the
end she demonstrates how a jurisprudence of an ethic of care alone would fail to
protect women's reproductive autonomy.7'
C.

RelationalFeminism v. LiberalFeminism and FetalPersonhood

Insight into the destabilizing potential of the Farley decision emerges from
Professor McClain's argument that a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy is
the test for the "translation of the relational approach and the ethic of care into
substantive law." 7- One scholar, Professor Leslie Bender, commits her scholarship
to envisioning how principles of relational feminism could alter substantive law.7

"
(6

McClain, supra note 14, at 1183.
Id. at 1183 nn.34, 43-44 (Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988);

Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A PhenomenologicalCritique of Feminist
Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987); Robin West, Feminism, CriticalSocial Theory and
Law, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59; Robin West, Love, Rage and Legal Theory, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
101 (1989)).
67 Id. at I181 n.32.
611Id. at 1184-86.
,9 Id. at 1203-18.
70 McClain, supra note 14, at 1218-28.

7, Id. at 1242-63.
72 Id. at 1242.
" Id. at 1229 (citing Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3 (1988); Leslie Bender, Changingthe Values in Tort Law, 25 TULSA L.J. 759 (1990)); see also
Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an Ethic
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Professor McClain uses Bender's pathbreaking attempts to make operational the
"ethic of care" in law through a duty to rescue to explore the dangers it presents to
women's reproductive autonomy.74
For additional support, McClain argues that Robin West's suggestion that
abortion be viewed as an exercise of responsibility75 and Ruth Colker's view that it
be seen as a decision of responsible connection with other members of society76 are
both fraught with danger. The gist of the danger appears to be that principles of
responsibility and care could be used, if not understood as a complex process of the
responsible exercise of autonomous decision-making, to justify the imposition by
law upon pregnant women that the only way to act responsibly, connectedly,
through an expression of the ethic of care, would be to carry every pregnancy to
term.
To avoid this risk, McClain suggests that the relational feminist's definition
of responsibility must be "synonymous with autonomy" and include "selfdetermination and the freedom to make a difficult decision about the course of one's
life" or it will "endanger women's reproductive freedom."77 She agrees that
relational feminism has been right to focus on "relationships, care, and
interdependency" and acknowledges its contribution in bringing a balance of
connectedness and responsibility for others to liberalism's individualism and
responsibility for self.78 Yet she advises that relational feminists are wrong to think
that there is a "stark pick" between the two visions ofjustice: relationship and care
or autonomy and individual rights.79 For support she turns to Rawls and Dworkin
to demonstrate the poverty of a view of liberalism that does not see in it

ofCare in Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 1 (1990); Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability
Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DuKE L.J. 848; Leslie Bender, A Feminist
Analysis of Physician-AssistedDying and Voluntary Active Euthanasia,59 TENN. L. REv. 519 (1992).
4 McClain, supra note 14, at 1229.
75
76

Id. at 1243 (citing Robin West, Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REv. 43 (1990)).
Id. (citing Ruth Colker, Feminist Litigation: An Oxymoron?--- A Study of the Briefs Filed in

William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 137 (1990); Ruth
Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis of United States Reproductive Health Policy: Gender, Race,
Age, and Class, 1991 DUKE L.J. 324).
77

Id. at 1244.

78 Id.

at 1263.

71 McClain, supra note 14, at 1263.
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"interdependency, connection, and responsibility."8 Ultimately, she advises that
there must be a dialogue between relational feminism and liberalism and that those
who adhere to an ethic of care and responsibility as a model of justice must "place
a strong value on self-determination and rights."'"
IV. FARLEY, THE "ETHIC OF CARE," AND REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY

A.

Farley and the "Ethic of Care"

McClain's perspective that relational feminism and its call for an "ethic of
care" endangers reproductive rights if it fails to acknowledge the critical role of
autonomy, sheds light on the response to Farley by those who advocate for women's
reproductive rights. Farley provides an example of the "ethic of care" made
operational in law. If the defining principles of the "ethic of care" are those of
connection, interdependency and care, Farley embraces them. For the court in
Farley made explicit its commitment to these values.
As a backdrop, the court pointed out that the fundamental purpose of
wrongful death statutes is to deter tortious conduct and thereby "preserve and
protect human life."8' 2 It wamed that when potential human life in the form of a
nonviable fetus is fatally injured through another's tortious conduct, justice will be
denied if the tortfeasor is not held responsible.83 Next describing the relational
interests protected by its decision, the court commented that injustice would result
if the wrongdoer is exempt from legal responsibility because of the "happenstance"
that the "unborn child" is not yet viable. 4 While none of these statements in
isolation support the position that the opinion reflects an ethic of care, their
cumulative effect is one of care and responsibility. There is other language from the
court, however, that places the decision squarely within relational feminism. When
the court commented on the loss of life, it is not a singular life, lived in isolated
autonomy that the court recognized. Rather the court seized upon the loss to those
interdependent with the fetus, in the web of connected lives. The court said that
"[t]he societal and parental loss is egregious," no matter whether the fetus is viable

go Id.

"' Id. at 1264.
82

Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 531 (W. Va 1995) (citing Espadero v. Feld, 649 F. Supp. 1480,

1483 (D. Colo. 1986); Volkv. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11, 15 (Idaho 1982)).
"3Id. at 532.
84

Id. at 533.
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or not.85

Explicitly interpreting society's fundamental values, the court stated that
Farley stands for the shared value "that life-old, young, and prospective-should
not be wrongfully taken away. ' ,16 Just because this potential life had not yet reached
the legally-recognized stage of fetal development of viability, this was no reason to
deny its interconnectedness with its family." Recognizing the importance of the
prospective relationship, the court advised that "[w]hen a family loses a potential
member" the injury is not less than if"it loses an existing member."88 It concluded
that this "life... would have provided love and sustenance," if it had not been cut
short by the tortious conduct of the wrongdoer.8
Viewing these statements in light of the facts in Farley, that the surviving
father and husband sues for the death of his pregnant wife and the fetus she carried,
the court's statements about "love and sustenance," and "family" are markedly
similar to the values advanced by relational feminists. For example, Robin West,
among others, writes of the significant role that nurturance plays in life. She admits
to the centrality of others in one's life, pointing out that to think of a human as alone
and separate is incorrect. Doubtless she would see the father's grief at the loss of
his potential child as an expression of connectedness not historically attributed to
men, but one desired and promoted by many feminists.
Farley and Reproductive Autonomy

B.

But perhaps this is the point at which one should heed the adage, "be careful
what you wish for, you just might get it." If what is being wished for is greater
connectedness with their children and greater nurturing and responsibility for the
care of children on the part of men, why cannot a man make a claim for wrongful
death against the actions of a woman who carries his child? Why should his claims,
based on interconnectedness and loss, be only against a tortious wrongdoer? Should
he not be given at least equal rights in a woman's decision to terminate the
pregnancy of his and her potential child?
These are the questions left open by the "ethic of care" and the Farley case.
This is the reason why it is both wonderful and frightening. For despite the

85 Id.
86

Id.

11

Farley,466 S.E.2d at 534.

8 Id. at 534.
89

Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol99/iss2/7

16

McConnell: Relational and Liberal Feminism: The Ethic of Care, Fetal Personh
1996]

RELATIONAL AND LIBERAL FEMINISM

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia's admonitions that its decision should
not be interpreted as implicating rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution
or any state law, other than the wrongful death statute, the decision is not merely a
legal precedent, but is also a philosophical catalyst. The court explicitly limited the
precedential value of Farley in the context of a woman's right to abortion. The
court is silent, however, about its potential effects in other areas of state law. This
raises the specter that Farley, as philosophical catalyst, could contribute to
legislative and judicial incursions into women's reproductive autonomy. 90
C.

DeclaringFetalPersonhoodLeads to AdversarialRelationship Between
Mother andFetus

Lest this sound like a cry of wolf, it is worth reviewing the trend in liability
for fetal injury. Generally, there is a trend toward increased civil and criminal
liability for injuries to fetuses. The trend began with suits by parents against tortious
third-parties but progressed rapidly, however, to civil suits by children and their
fathers against mothers9' and criminal prosecutions of mothers by the state.92 Both
of these situations share a central premise, which is that a pregnant woman should
literally pay for the harm done to her fetus, either through monetary damages or
through criminal punishment. 93

" See Janet Gallagher, PrenatalInvasions & Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10
HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 9, 41 (1987) (observing that "even when judges attempt to carefully limit their
holdings in fetal cases, their decisions become springboards for new, intrusive state actions against
pregnant women").
91 Most states have abrogated, at least partially, intra familial tort immunity. See KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 15, § 122. States abolished the immunity protecting spouses from liability when one acted
tortiously toward the other first. Id. They later abolished parent/child immunity. Id. In Grodin v.
Grodin, the Supreme Court of Michigan opened the door to maternal liability for prenatal injuries by
holding that a mother would be liable for prenatal injuries if she had not acted reasonably under all the
circumstances in taking a prescription drug that caused her child's teeth to be brown. 301 N.W.2d 869
(Mich. 1981).
92 Criminal prosecutions against women for conduct injurious to their fetuses grew dramatically when

state prosecutors responded to the crack epidemic among young women. For an excellent article on
the causes of the crack epidemic and the punitive responses by the states against pregnant women,
particularly women of color, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing DrugAddicts Who Have Babies:
Women of Color,Equality, andthe Right ofPrivacy, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1419 (1991).
9' Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology of
Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of the Law, 53
OHIO ST. L.J. 1205, 1261-85 (1992). Professor Ikemoto writes that the law regulates pregnancy
through civil and criminal law. Id. This occurs primarily through "tort liability, criminal prosecution
and findings of child neglect based on conduct during pregnancy." Id. at 1261.
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State prosecutors have attempted to transfer the expanded definition of the
fetus for wrongful death purposes to support the criminal prosecutions of pregnant
women for their conduct during pregnancy.94 Until recently, these attempts were
unsuccessful.9' However, shortly after the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia decided Farley,the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the prosecution
of a woman for her conduct during pregnancy, thereby accepting the prosecution's
96
argument that fetal personhood should be adopted from the wrongful death statute.
The Whitner Court did exactly what was feared by opponents of the Farley
decision. Whitner concerns criminal responsibility for child abuse and neglect of
a viable fetus.97 The Supreme Court of South Carolina found it "absurd" to declare
fetal personhood in the context of wrongful death statutes, but not in the context of
child abuse. 9 The next step on the continuum is to extend the definition of child to
a non-viable fetus. As one dissenting judge advises, the court cannot logically draw
a distinction between viable and nonviable fetuses. 99 He supports his position by
showing that the current Whitner distinction does not include the period of fetal
development, nonviability, during which the greatest harm occurs from substance
abuse. Thus, women who engage in harmful conduct when the fetus is most likely
to be harmed will not be criminally liable, while those who engage in harmful
conduct during the period of reduced vulnerability will be."° Thus, the dissent
predicts that the definition of "child" will be extended to include nonviable fetuses

Brief of Amici Curiae West Virginia Free in Support of Dismissal of Petitioner's Wrongful Death
Action on Behalf of aNonviable Fetus at 11 -13, Farley v. Sartin,466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995) (No.
22797) (hereinafter "Amici Brief'). Amici refer to the following cases in which the states attempted
to justify criminal prosecutions of pregnant women for their behavior during pregnancy:
Commonwealth v. Kemp, No. 00114 Pittsburgh 1993, slip op. at 5-6 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 1994);
Collins v. State, No. 08-93-00404-CR, slip op. at 6-7 (Tx. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 1994); State v. Gray, No.
Cr88-7406, slip op. at 6 (Ohio C.P. July 13, 1989), ajd, 584 N.E. 2d 710 (Ohio 1992);
Commonwealth v. Wilcox, No. A-44116-01, slip op. at 4 (Va. Dist. Ct. Oct. 9, 1991); Commonwealth
v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip op. at 12 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990). Amici Brief, supra at 11-12.
94

9sAmici Brief,supra note 93, at 11-13.
' Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164 (S.C. July 15, 1996).
97 id.

9'Id. at *3.
99Id. at *9 (Moore, J., dissenting). Justice Moore also concurs with the dissenting opinion of Chief
Justice Finney. Id.
'00 Whitner, 1996 WL 393164 at *9.
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in South Carolina.' 0 '
V. CONCLUSION: DECLARING REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY

Professor Ronald Dworkin, a renowned legal moral philosopher, argues that
we cannot begin to resolve the debate about abortion as long as we continue to
discuss it in terms of fetal personhood. 1° We must, he advises, admit that what is
at issue is the moral sense of society that there is intrinsic value in human life and
that decisions of life and death are decisions of moral responsibility that can remain
only with the individual who is the moral decision maker. Dworkin's position
reflects Professor McClain's concerns, that relational feminism incorporate
autonomy principles from liberalism. By discussing the opportunity robbed by the
tortious wrongdoer in Farley,the court communicated a Dworkin-like position that
a tortious act interferes with another's moral decision making and violates society's
intent to have individuals be autonomous moral decision makers.
The court, however, failed to communicate the same for autonomy. Its
statements that Farley in no way affect a woman's Constitutional rights, do not go
far enough. As is demonstrated by the South Carolina example so much more is at
stake. What is at stake is a woman's interest in being able to operate as a moral
decision maker attempting to balance what is best for her, the fetus, her relations and
the societal value in potential human life. To protect this interest from incursion
justified by the declaration of fetal personhood for the purposes of wrongful death,
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia needed to state explicitly that its
decision would not justify placing the mother and the fetus in an adversarial
relationship. It could have done this by declaring that relational and autonomy
interests are protected by not permitting tortious interference with the right of a
woman to carry a fetus to term and by maintaining a woman's right under state law
to make the decisions that she needs to make regarding her fetus without the threat
of interference from the state or others.
The philosophical debate that rages on issues of life and death forces each
of us to examine our own moral positions on these issues. It challenges us to
consider what we will do when these issues confront us. Farley attempts to protect
the right to make these decisions by not allowing a tortfeasor to rob us of the
opportunity to make them. From this perspective, the decision is welcome and
affirms both relational interests and autonomy. Unfortunately, however, it also
opens the door to incursions on reproductive autonomy without sufficient
precautions to stop the state and others from inserting themselves into the moral
to' Id.
102

RONALD DwoRKiN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND

INDIvIDuAL FREEDOM

67 (1993).
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decision making involved. What we can do now is hope that the court's attempt to
limit Farley will succeed and that West Virginia courts will not permit fetal
personhood to transgress the boundary of wrongful death actions. The legislature,
urged by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Farley to amend the
wrongful death statute to clarify whether the statute includes fetal death, should
accept the court's challenge. 3 For the legislature can clarify that the statute
includes fetal death, but do it without expanding the definition of "person." By
doing this, West Virginia can distinguish itself as a state that values relational
interests and protects fetal health without sacrificing maternal autonomy.

"03Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 534 (W. Va. 1995).
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